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ABSTRACT
We present a detailed analysis of the incentives that Social Security provides for continued
work at older ages.  We do so using information on older males from the Health and Retirement
Study over the 1980-1997 period to calculate the changes in the present discounted value of Social
Security entitlements from additional work at each age.  We find that the median male worker faces
a small tax on work at ages 55-61, a near zero tax at ages 62-64, and a large tax at ages 65-69.
However, there is significant heterogeneity in tax rates.  We also document significant non-
monotonicities in the accrual of Social Security entitlements with additional work, and suggest a
more appropriate measure of incentive effects that considers accruals over not just the next year but
future years as well.
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1  Both figures are from Diamond and Gruber (1998).
1
One of the most striking labor force phenomena of the second half of the twentieth
century has been the rapid decline in the labor force participation rate of older men.   In 1950, for
example, 81% of 62 year old men were in the labor force; by 1995, this figure had fallen to 51%,
though it has rebounded slightly in the past few years (Quinn, 1999).   Declines have been seen
for all groups of older men, as illustrated by Figure 1.  For women, these declines with age have
been offset by an overall rising trend in labor force participation, as shown in Figure 2.
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Much has been written about the proximate causes of this important trend among older
men, and in particular about the role of the Social Security program.  A large number of articles
have documented pronounced “spikes” in retirement at ages 62 and 65, which correspond to the
early and normal retirement ages for Social Security, respectively.  While there are some other
explanations for a spike at age 65, such as entitlement to health insurance under the Medicare
program or rounding error in surveys, there is little reason to see a spike at 62 other than the
Social Security program.  Indeed, as Burtless and Moffitt (1984) document, this spike at age 62
only emerged after the early retirement eligibility age for men was introduced in 1961.
The presence of these strong patterns in retirement data suggest that SS is playing a
critical role in determining retirement decisions.  But in order to model the impact of SS reform
on retirement behavior, it is critical to understand what this role is.  The evidence of spikes at age
62, for example, is consistent with at least three alternative hypotheses.  The first is that there is
an actuarial unfairness built into the system penalizing work past age 62, so that there is a “tax”2
effect that leads workers to leave at that age.   The second is that workers are liquidity
constrained; they would like to retire before age 62, but cannot because they are unable to borrow
against their SS benefits and have no other source of retirement support.  In this case, there will
be a large exit at age 62 as benefits first become available.  The third is that workers are myopic
or information constrained; they either do not understand or do not appreciate the actuarial
incentives for additional work past age 62, so they retire as soon as benefits become available.
The existing evidence would appear to refute the first explanation.  Diamond and Gruber
(1998) calculate for a typical individual the implicit tax on continued work at each age from the
Social Security system and find that there is actually a small subsidy to continued work at age 62. 
There is some supportive evidence for the second view; Kahn (1988) finds that there is a
pronounced spike in the retirement hazard at age 62 for those with low wealth, but that the much
larger spike is at age 65 for those with higher wealth.  There is little work on the third view, other
than a recent careful exposition of the model by Diamond and Koszegi (1998).
This paper provides a more thorough investigation of the first effect, the tax effect, along
four dimensions.  First, we assess whether the tax rate Diamond and Gruber compute using a
synthetic individual with annual earnings at the median of his cohort is similar to the tax rate of
the real median person.  We might expect a difference, as the shape of the earnings history is a
significant determinant of SS incentives through the dropout years provision and this is not
appropriately reflected with a synthetic earnings history.  Second, we assess the distribution of
retirement incentives across the population.  Even if there is not a significant disincentive for the
typical worker, disincentives for a large subset of workers could still be associated with a spike in
the aggregate retirement data.  Third, we assess the importance of considering incentives for3
retirement in the next year versus incentives for retirement over all possible years, drawing on the
insights of the option value model of Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b).  Finally, we incorporate
the role of private pensions, an important determinant of retirement for a large share of workers.
Our strategy is to apply the model of Diamond and Gruber to a set of real individuals, the
older persons surveyed by the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).  This is a very rich survey
with information on individual SS earnings histories, private pension plan details, and
demographics.  This data allows us to carefully compute the incentives for retirement from SS
and pensions, both for the median individual and across the distribution.
Our paper proceeds as follows.  We begin, in Part I, with background on the relevant
institutional features of the SS system and the previous literature in this area.   In Part II, we
describe our data and empirical strategy.  Part III presents our basic results for the accrual of
Social Security wealth with additional work and the associated tax/subsidy relative to potential
earnings, both on average and across the distribution.  Part IV then highlights the fundamental
weakness of simple one year accrual measures of this type: many Social Security wealth
trajectories are non-monotonic, suggesting that the appropriate measure must look across all
years to find the optimal retirement date.  We then present calculations for what we label “peak
value,” an incentive measure which provides a middle ground between accrual and the utility-
based option value metric of Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) by comparing retirement wealth at
the current retirement date to retirement wealth at its global maximum.  In this section, we also
extend the results to incorporate private pensions.   Part V concludes by discussing the
implications of our findings and the directions for future research.     
2  The total OASI +DI contribution rate has been 6.2% since 1990, although the division
between the two parts has varied slightly from year to year; the OASI portion is 5.35% in 1999
and will be 5.3% starting in 2000. 
     
3  In particular, while earnings through age 59 are converted to real dollars for averaging,
earnings after age 60 are treated nominally.  There is a two-year lag in availability of the wage
index, calling for a base in the year in which the worker turns 60 in order to be able to compute
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Part I: Background
Institutional Features of Social Security
The Social Security system is financed by a payroll tax which is levied equally on
workers and firms.  The total payroll tax paid by each party is 7.65 percentage points; 5.3
percentage points are devoted to the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, with 0.9
percentage points funding the Disability Insurance (DI) system and 1.45 percentage points
funding Medicare's Hospital Insurance (HI) program.
2  The payroll tax that funds OASI and DI is
levied on earnings up to the taxable maximum, $72,600 in 1999; the HI tax is uncapped.
Individuals qualify for an OASI pension by working for 40 quarters in covered
employment, which now encompasses most sectors of the economy.  Benefits are determined in
several steps.  The first step is computation of the worker's Averaged Indexed Monthly Earnings
(AIME), which is 1/12th of the average of the worker's annual earnings in covered employment,
indexed by a national wage index. A key feature of this process is that additional higher earnings
years can replace earlier lower earnings years, since only the highest 35 years of earnings are
used in the calculation (the “dropout year provision”).
3benefits for workers retiring at their 62nd birthdays.  While it would be possible to make
adjustments as data become available, this is not done.  This gap would become important if we
had large and varying inflation rates.
     
4  The reduction factor will be only 5/12 of one percent for months beyond 36 months before
the NRA, which will become relevant once the delay in NRA becomes effective.  
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The next step of the benefits calculation is to convert the AIME into the Primary
Insurance Amount (PIA).  This is done by applying a three-piece linear progressive schedule to
an individual's average earnings, whereby 90 cents of the first dollar of earnings is converted to
benefits, while only 15 cents of the last dollar of earnings (up to the taxable maximum) is so
converted.  As a result, the rate at which SS replaces past earnings (the "replacement rate") falls
with the level of lifetime earnings.  While up to 85% of SS benefits are subject to tax for retirees
with sufficiently high incomes (couples with non-SS income above $32,000 in 1999), all of
earnings are taxed (including the employee portion of the payroll tax), raising the effective
replacement rate of the program. 
The final step is to adjust the PIA based on the age at which benefits are first claimed. 
For workers commencing benefit receipt at the Normal Retirement Age (currently 65, but
legislated to slowly increase to 67), the monthly benefit is the PIA.  For workers claiming before
the NRA, benefits are decreased by an actuarial reduction factor of 5/9 of one percent per month;
thus, a worker claiming on his 62
nd birthday receives 80% of the PIA.
4  Individuals can also delay
the receipt of benefits beyond the NRA and receive a Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC).  For     
5  Spousal benefits can begin earlier if there is a dependent child in the household; spousal
benefits are also subject to actuarial reduction if receipt commences before the spouse’s NRA.
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workers reaching age 65 in 1999, an additional 5.5% is paid for each year of delay; this amount
will steadily increase until it reaches 8% per year in 2008.
While a worker may claim as early as age 62, receipt of SS benefits is conditioned on the
"earnings test" until the worker reaches age 70.  A worker age 62 to 65 may earn up to $9,600 in
1999 without the loss of any benefits, then benefits are reduced $1 for each $2 of earnings above
this amount; for workers age 65 to 69, the earnings test floor is $15,500 and benefits are reduced
at a rate of $1 for each $3 in earnings.  Months of benefits lost through the earnings test are
treated as delayed receipt, entitling the worker to a delayed retirement credit on the lost benefits
when he does claim benefits.  Despite this, the earnings test appears to have a  pronounced effect
on retirement decisions, with evidence of extreme “piling up” of the earnings distribution among
elderly workers at the earnings test limit (Friedberg, 1998).
One of the most important features of Social Security is that it also provides benefits to
dependents of covered workers.  Spouses of SS beneficiaries receive a dependent spouse benefit
equal to 50% of the worker’s PIA, which is available once the worker has claimed benefits and
the spouse has reached age 62; however, the spouse only receives the larger of this and her own
entitlement as a worker.
5  Dependent children are also each eligible for 50% of the PIA, but the
total family benefit cannot exceed a maximum which is roughly 175% of the PIA.  Surviving
spouses receive 100% of the PIA, beginning at age 60, although there is an actuarial reduction for
claiming benefits before age 65 or if the worker had an actuarial reduction.  In practice,     
6  Earlier work by Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980, 1981) and Burkhauser and Turner (1981)
calculates tax rates under the pre-1977 Social Security rules.
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estimating a family’s total benefits is complicated by the fact that both spouses may qualify for
SS benefits as retired workers.  Finally, benefit payments are adjusted for increases in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) after the worker has reached age 62; thus, Social Security provides a
real annuity.
Previous Related Literature
There are two broad strands of the literature on Social Security that are related to this
paper.  The first strand attempts to document the labor force disincentives inherent in Social
Security, or implicit SS “tax rates.”  Feldstein and Samwick (1992) model the tax rates on the
marginal earnings decision for simulated workers of different ages, earnings, and marital status. 
They find that there are significant marginal tax rates on earnings for higher income workers and
secondary earners, and for younger workers as well.
6  
A subsequent paper by Diamond and Gruber (1998) focuses more directly on tax rates on
around the time of retirement.  They build a simulation model similar to that used here and
compute  SS tax rates for simulated workers.  As noted above, they find that for the median
worker, there is little net incentive or disincentive for continued work at age 62, although there is
a sizeable positive tax rate at age 65 and beyond due to the unfair Delayed Retirement Credit still
in place.  They also find that tax rates are higher for single workers, since they do not benefit
from dependent and survivors benefits, and that tax rates are initially lower for low earners (who8
benefit from the redistributive nature of benefits) but eventually higher (since they are penalized
more by actuarial unfairness after age 65).
While suggestive, both of these studies suffer from a key limitation: they do not consider
the incentives facing real individuals.  This is important because of the dropout years provision,
which implies that the actual pattern of earnings, and not just the level of average or final
earnings, matters for benefits determination.  As we will show later, even for workers with the
same average and final earnings, there is considerable heterogeneity in SS tax rates.  By
considering a real sample of individuals, we will be able to appropriately measure both the
incentives for the median worker and the underlying heterogeneity in these incentives.
The second literature is that on the retirement effects of Social Security.   A number of
studies use aggregate information on the labor force behavior of workers at different ages, such
as that documented in the introduction, to infer the role that is played by Social Security.  Hurd
(1990) and Ruhm (1994) emphasize the spike in the age pattern of retirement at age 62; as Hurd
(1990) states, "there are no other institutional or economic reasons for the peak".  Using precise
quarterly data, Blau (1994) finds that almost one-quarter of the men remaining in the labor force
at their 65th birthday retire within the next three months; this hazard rate is over 2.5 times as
large as the rate in surrounding quarters.  However, Lumsdaine and Wise (1994) document that
this penalty alone cannot account for this "excess" retirement at age 65, nor can the incentives
embedded in private pension plans or the availability of retirement health insurance through the
Medicare program.  This does not rule out a role for Social Security; by setting up the "focal
point" of a normal retirement age, the program may be the causal factor in explaining this spike.
The main body of the retirement incentives literature attempts to specifically model the     
7  The data used are generally the Retirement History Survey (Boskin and Hurd, 1978;
Burtless, 1986; Burtless and Moffitt, 1984; Hurd and Boskin, 1984; Fields and Mitchell, 1984;
Blau, 1994), although some authors have relied on the National Longitudinal Survey of Older
Men (Diamond and Hausman, 1984), and recent work uses the Survey of Consumer Finances
(Samwick, 1998).
     
8  The earliest studies (Boskin and Hurd, 1978; Fields and Mitchell, 1984) used standard
linear or non-linear regression techniques.  Later research (Burtless, 1986; Burtless and Moffitt,
1984) used non-linear budget constraint estimation to capture the richness of Social Security's
effects on the opportunity set.  The most recent work (Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Hausman
and Wise, 1985; Samwick, 1998; Blau, 1994) uses dynamic estimation of the retirement
transition.
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role that potential SS benefits play in determining retirement.  The general strategy followed by
this literature is to use micro-data sets with information on potential SS benefit determinants
(earnings histories) or ex-post benefit levels to measure the incentives to retire across individuals
in the data.
7  Then, retirement models are estimated as a function of these incentive measures. 
While the exact modeling technique differs substantially across papers,
8 the conclusions drawn
are fairly similar: SS has large effects on retirement, but they are small relative to the trends over
time documented in Figures 1 and 2.  For example, Burtless (1986) found that the 20% benefit
rise of the 1969 to 1972 period raised the probability of retirement at 62 and 65 by about 2
percentage points.  Over this period, however, the labor force participation of older men fell by     
9  One exception is Hurd and Boskin (1984), who claim that the large benefits increases of the
1968-1973 period can explain all of the change in labor force participation in those years.
     
10  See Meyer (1989) for a careful discussion of this issue in the context of Unemployment
Insurance (UI).
     
11  At a minimum, one would want to include the level of lifetime earnings as a regressor, but
most studies include only earnings in a recent year (ie. Boskin and Hurd, 1978; Burtless, 1986). 
In addition, even using a somewhat longer time frame for measuring the earnings control (as
10
over 6%, so that SS can only explain about 1/3 of the change.
9
  This literature suffers from two important limitations.  First, the key regressor, Social
Security benefits, is a non-linear function of past earnings, and retirement propensities are clearly
correlated with past earnings levels.  This problem is common to the social insurance literature in
the U.S.
10  But for other social insurance programs there is often variation along dimensions
arguably exogenous to individual tastes, such as different legislative regimes across locations or
within locations over time, that can be used to identify behavioral models.  There is no
comparable variation in Social Security, which is a nationally homogeneous program.  Of course,
this criticism does not necessarily imply that the estimates of this cross-sectional literature are
flawed; as Hurd (1990) emphasizes, the non-linearities in the SS benefits determination process
are unlikely to be correlated with retirement propensities.  But there has been little serious effort
to decompose the sources of variation in SS benefits in an effort to assess whether the
determinants that drive retirement behavior are plausibly excluded from a retirement equation.
11Diamond and Hausman, 1984, do) does not solve the problem; one could imagine that certain
features of the lifetime pattern of earnings are correlated with both benefit levels and retirement
decisions, such as the ratio of earnings around age 62 to earnings at earlier ages (since
individuals who have relatively high earnings at older ages may have better labor market
opportunities around the age of retirement and therefore work longer).
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This criticism is levied most compellingly by Krueger and Pischke (1992), who note that
there is a unique "natural experiment" provided by the end of double-indexing for the "notch
generation" that retired in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  For this cohort, SS benefits were
greatly reduced relative to what they would have expected based on the experience of the early-
mid 1970s.  Yet, the dramatic fall in labor force participation continued unabated in this era. 
This raises important questions about the identification of this cross-sectional literature.
The second problem with this literature is that it generally focuses on only one of the two
key SS benefits variables, including SS benefits or wealth but ignoring the SS tax/subsidy rate
documented above.  In theory, as discussed above, both of these factors play an important role in
determining retirement behavior.  Studies which include the tax/subsidy rate find it to have a
significant role in explaining retirement (Fields and Mitchell, 1984; Samwick, 1993); indeed,
even in Krueger and Pischke's (1992) paper the accrual rate is often right-signed and significant,
even as the wealth effect is insignificant.  More recently, Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) note
that the correct regressor for considering both SS and pension incentives for retirement is not the
year to year accrual rate, but the return to working this year relative to retiring at some future
optimal date.       
12  Only earnings since 1950 are required to compute SS benefits for our sample’s age range;
the benefit rules specify that a shorter averaging period is used for persons born prior to 1929.
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Our findings are relevant to addressing both these shortcomings.  To the extent that we
find substantial variation in the retirement incentives facing workers under the SS system, even
after conditioning on correlates of the retirement decision such as earnings, it suggests that there
are significant non-linearities in the determination of SS incentives which can help identify
retirement impacts.  And we will compare the retirement incentives over the subsequent year
with those over all future years, following the insights of Stock and Wise.
Part II: Data and Empirical Strategy
Data
Our data for this analysis comes from the Health and Retirement Study.  The HRS is a
survey of individuals aged 51-61 in 1992 with re-interviews every two years; the first two waves
of the survey (1992 and 1994) and preliminary data for the third and fourth waves (1996 and
1998) are available at this time.  Spouses of respondents are also interviewed, so the total age
range covered by the survey is much wider.  
A key feature of the HRS is that it includes Social Security earnings histories back to
1951 for most respondents.  This provides two advantages for our empirical work.  First, it
allows us to appropriately calculate benefit entitlements, which depend (through the dropout year
provision) on the entire history of earnings.
12  Second, it allows us to construct a large sample of
person-year observations by using the earnings histories to compute SS retirement incentives and     
13Individuals were required to sign a permission form in order for their SS records to be
attached; approximately 75% of the sample gave permission.  Haider and Solon (1999) find that
willingness to give permission varies only weakly with observable characteristics.
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labor force participation at each age.  We use all person-year observations on men age 55-69 for
our analysis, subject to the exclusions detailed below.
Our sample is selected conditional on working, so that we examine the incentives for
retirement conditional on being in the labor force.  Work is defined in one of two ways.  For
those person-years before 1992, when we are using earnings histories, we define work as positive
earnings in two consecutive years; if earnings are positive this year but zero the next, we consider
the person to have retired this year.  For person-years from 1992 onwards, when we have the
actual survey responses, we cannot use this earnings-based definition, since we only have
earnings at two year intervals.  For this era, we use information on self-reported retirement status
and dates of retirement to construct annual retirement measures.  While these are somewhat
different constructs, the retirement rates by age are similar across the two samples, so we
combine them for precision purposes.  We also only consider individuals before their first
retirement; if a person who is categorized as retired reenters the labor force, the later observations
are not used.
Our sample selection criteria are documented in Table 1.  There are 6,173 men who
participate in one or more waves of the HRS.  We exclude 121 men who were born before 1922
and thus subject to different SS benefit rules.  We lose an additional 1,747 men due to a lack SS
earnings history data.
13  We lose 860 men who cease working prior to age 55, and an additional     
14  We keep observations for which the wife’s SS earnings records are not available but we
can ascertain from the self-reported labor force histories that the wife worked less than half as
many years as the husband.  
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214 men due to a lack of information on their wives’ SS earnings histories (necessary due to the
family structure of benefits).
14  The 3,231 remaining observations are converted into 18,903
person-year observations by creating one observation for each year from 1980 through 1997 in
which the individual is between the ages of 55 and 69 and working.  Finally, we lose 1,356
person-year observations where the individual is working after a previous retirement.  The final
sample size is 17,547 person-year observations. 
Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to measure the retirement incentives inherent in SS and private pension
systems.  For the case of Social Security, we begin with the calculation of an individual’s Social
Security Wealth.  The basis for this calculation is a simulation model that we have developed to
compute for any individual their Social Security entitlement for any age of retirement.  This is
based on a careful modeling of Social Security benefits rules, and our simulation model has been
cross-checked against the Social Security Administrations’s ANYPIA model for accuracy.
The next step in our simulation is to take these monthly benefit entitlements and compute
an expected net present discounted value of Social Security Wealth (SSW).  This requires
projecting benefits out until workers reach age 120, and then taking a weighted sum that
discounts future benefits by both the individual discount rate and the probability that the worker     
15  In principle, individual-specific mortality prospects should be used to compute SSW and
related retirement incentives.  In future work, we plan to use the richer information in the HRS
on health and even subjective mortality evaluation to do these richer calculations.
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will live to a given future age.  Our methodology for doing so is described in Appendix I.  For the
worker himself, this is fairly straightforward; it is simply a sum of future benefits, discounted
backwards by time preference rates and mortality rates.  For dependent and survivor benefits, it is
more complicated, since we must account for the joint likelihood of survival of the worker and
the dependent.  In our base case, we use a real discount rate of 3%.  To adjust for mortality
prospects, we use the sex/age specific U.S. life tables from U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (1990).
15  All figures are discounted back to age 55 by both time preference
rates and mortality risk.
For the output of the simulations, we calculate several different concepts.  The first is the
level of SSW.  The second is the accrual, or the dollar change in SSW from the previous year.  
We then compute the “after-tax accrual”, which subtracts from this dollar change the payroll
taxes paid by the worker and his employer (assuming full tax incidence on wages).   Finally,
since it is natural to think about these incentives relative to the returns from additional work, we
also follow Diamond and Gruber (1998) in calculating the implicit tax/subsidy rate on additional
work, which normalizes the negative of the accrual by the potential wage for that year; a positive
accrual implies a negative tax rate and vice versa. Thus, if the tax rate is positive, it implies that
the SS system causes a disincentive to additional work through foregone SSW.   To measure the
full tax wedge, we use the gross wage in the denominator; under the assumption that the16
employer portion of payroll taxes is reflected in wages, we increase reported wages by 6.2%.
For assessing the accrual rate and related concepts used later in the paper, we must project
the worker’s earnings over the next year (or all future years) if he continues to work.  We
considered a number of different projection methodologies, and found that the best predictive
performance was from a model which simply grew earnings from the last observation by 1% real
growth per year, so this is the assumption we use for our simulations.
For the purposes of the simulations below, we assume that workers claim SS benefits at
the point of their retirement, or when they become eligible if they retire before the point of
eligibility.  In fact, this is not necessarily true; retirement and claiming are two distinct events,
and for certain values of mortality prospects and discount rates it is optimal to delay claiming
until some time after retirement (due to the actuarial adjustment of benefits).  Coile, Diamond,
Gruber, and Jousten (1999) investigate this issue in some detail, using simulation analysis to
document the gains to delaying claiming and showing that a non-trivial share of individuals do
delay claiming past age 62.  In this case, our calculations will overstate any subsidies to
continued work, since part of this subsidy will come from delayed claiming that could be
obtained without delaying retirement.
Also, it is important to highlight that our work is focused on the impact of SS on the labor
force participation decision.  A separate and interesting issue is the impact of SS on the marginal
labor supply decision among those participating in the labor force, which was the focus of the
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) analysis.  This is more complicated for those around retirement
age, since it involves incorporating the role of the earnings test, which we avoid with our analysis
of participation.  This, in turn, would involve modeling expectations about the earnings test,     
16  The SSW value is calculated from the data for age 55, and is then constrained to follow the
pattern of accruals from age 56 onwards.  We do this because the actual median SSW at each age
does not correspond to the accrual pattern.  If we use the SSW of the person with the median
accrual, the pattern of SSW is nonsensical (with large shifts from year to year), since that person
is different at every year.  If we use the median SSW across the sample in each year (picking the
median SSW in our sample, and not the SSW of the median accrual person), the SSW rises
substantially over all years, due to sample selection.  Another alternative is to project retirement
incentives out to age 69 for the sample working at age 55; doing so, we find that the median
SSW follows the same pattern as accruals, and that the accrual and tax variables are very similar
to what we report here.
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since individuals appear not to understand that this is just a benefits delay instead of a benefits
cut.  This is clearly a fruitful avenue for further research.
Part III: Social Security Accruals and Tax/Subsidies
Median Worker
We begin by considering the incentives facing the median worker at each age.  These
results are presented in Table 2.   Each row represents the incentives facing a worker whose last
year of work is labeled in the first column; that is, the age 55 row represents the incentives facing
a worker who decides to retire on his 56
th birthday.
16   We show for each age the SSW, the
accrual, the after-tax accrual, and tax/subsidy rate.  In the final column, we show the tax/subsidy
rate from Diamond and Gruber (1999), for comparison; their results are for a married male,18
which is appropriate since 90% of our sample is married.
We find that the median SSW for workers who retire on their 55
th birthday is $154,928. 
SSW grows steadily through age 65, then declines.  This is shown most clearly in the next
column, which presents the benefit accruals at each age.  From age 55-61, these accruals are
positive due to the dropout year provision; the median worker is increasing his SSW by replacing
lower earning years in his earnings average.  These accruals then get much larger between ages
62-64, due to the actuarial adjustment.  That is, the fact that accruals are larger after age 62
suggests that the actuarial adjustment is more than fair for the median worker; the gain to
delaying receipt outweighs the fact that benefits are received for fewer years.  At age 65 and
thereafter, however, there are negative accruals for working additional years, as the delayed
retirement credit is not sufficiently large to fairly compensate workers.
The next column amends the benefit accrual by incorporating the fact that the worker and
his employer must pay payroll taxes for additional work.  This reverses the signs on the accruals
at ages 55-61, which are now negative, as the small benefit of AIME recomputation is
outweighed by paying 12.4% of wages in tax.  However, at ages 62-64, the larger benefit accruals
approximately offset the taxes incurred through additional work, so that the after-tax accrual for
the median person is near zero.  The after-tax accrual then turns sharply negative from age 65
onwards.
The next column converts these after-tax accruals into tax/subsidy rates by dividing by
the gross wage.  There are positive taxes on work from age 55-61, but these taxes are
significantly lower than the statutory 12.4% payroll tax rate, due to the benefit of additional
earnings through the dropout year provision.  The tax rate is near zero for the median worker at19
ages 62 and 63 and is 2.7% at age 64.   From age 65 onwards, the tax rate is positive and very
large.  By age 68, the tax rate exceeds 30%; it drops back down again at age 69, but the samples
at these ages in the HRS are very small.
These results are very similar to those in Diamond and Gruber, in spite of several
important differences in methodology.  First, Diamond and Gruber use a smooth age-earnings
profile, which underestimates the value of the dropout year provision for people with real
earnings trajectories with more variance.  Second, Diamond and Gruber take an age 55 individual
and simulate his incentives to work at each future age, while the current calculations potentially
incorporate some selection effects by using only those individuals still working at each age.  The
most notable differences between the two sets of results are at age 55, where Diamond and
Gruber find a subsidy to work (by construction, their individual replaces a zero year of earnings
with his 55th year of work), and at age 62, where Diamond and Gruber find a subsidy of 2.8%
and we find a zero tax rate.  But the bottom line story is very similar: small taxes on work up
through age 61, tax rates near zero at ages 62-64, and more sizeable taxes after age 65.  Thus, we
reaffirm the important conclusion of previous studies that the SS system does not place a
significant tax on work at age 62 for the median worker.
Heterogeneity
As emphasized earlier, the incentives facing the median worker may mask considerable
heterogeneity across the population in retirement incentives.  Substantial heterogeneity may in
turn be associated with an increase in retirement rates at age 62, even if the incentives are small
for the median worker.  If for example, there are large tax rates on work for 50% of the20
population, and small subsidies to work for 50% of the population, then there may be a zero tax
rate for the median worker, but still potentially a large amount of retirement at age 62.
We explore the heterogeneity in incentives in Table 3, which shows the distribution of
after-tax accruals and of tax/subsidy rates by age.   As is immediately apparent, there is a
substantial amount of heterogeneity in the accruals and tax rates.   For example, from age 55-61,
while the median tax rate is positive and non-trivial, roughly one-sixth of the sample actually has
a subsidy to additional work.  At age 62, while there is a zero tax rate for the median worker,
10% of the sample faces a tax rate of 6.8% or higher and the standard deviation of the tax rate is
17.8%.  After age 65, while virtually all of the sample faces positive tax rates, there remains
substantial variation in the magnitude of the tax rate; at age 65, the standard deviation is nearly
twice as large as the median tax rate.
What explains this substantial heterogeneity in SS incentives?   This is an important
question for both understanding how SS incentives work and for considering the validity of
empirical work which relies on SS incentives to identify retirement behavior.  As highlighted by
Krueger and Pischke’s (1992) criticism of the previous literature, if the vast majority of the
variation in these incentives comes from factors such as wages or marital status, which are
themselves likely to be independently correlated with retirement decisions, we might worry that
incentive measures are capturing these other aspects of retirement decisions.  But if, as suggested
by Hurd’s (1990) rebuttal to this line of criticism, there are significant non-linearities and
interactions otherwise (likely) uncorrelated with retirement that primarily identify the impact of
these incentive measures, one might feel more confident about retirement estimates.
We next turn to regression modeling of SS accruals and tax/subsidy rates to address this21
question.  We consider in turn various potential determinants of the variation in incentives:
• Age: as shown earlier, there is important variation in tax rates with age
• Earnings in the last year of work: this is the denominator of the tax rate, and will also
enter through the dropout year provision.  This may as a result have both linear and non-
linear effects, so we try both a linear earnings term and an earnings quartic.
• AIME: Average lifetime earnings is the primary determinant of benefits.  Once again, the
effects will be non-linear, through the redistributive function that determines the PIA.
• Marital status and age difference with spouse: Marital status will be an important
determinant of tax rates through the dependent benefits structure.  In addition, larger the
positive age difference between spouses (a larger number of years by which the husband
is older), the larger the value of the dependent spouse and survivor benefits.
• Earnings in lowest year: In combination with earnings in the last year, earnings in the
lowest year will determine the value of the dropout year provision.  We also include the
number of years in the 35-year earning history with earnings below current earnings.
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 4.  We find that the explanatory power on
the accrual is much more substantial than on the tax/subsidy rate, which is not surprising since
the tax/subsidy rate introduces additional variation simply by normalizing by the wage.  Thus, we
focus on the accrual in our discussion.
Our overall conclusion is that, while these factors have some ability to explain accrual
patterns, the overall explanatory power is small.  Factors clearly (potentially) correlated with
tastes for retirement such as age, current earnings, and lifetime earnings, even when the former is
entered as a series of dummies and the latter as flexible cubic functions, explains less than 25%
of the variation in accruals.  Even if we include a full set of interactions of these cubic functions
of earnings and AIME, we only explain 27% of the variation.  Adding marital status, age
difference with spouse, spouse’s earnings, and the low earnings year explains only another 2% of
variation.  Thus there appears to be a substantial amount of variation in the accrual that is not22
explained by factors that would plausibly otherwise be correlated with retirement. 
Part IV: Peak Value Calculations
Motivation
The results thus far have focused on one year accruals of SSW and the associated
tax/subsidy rates on an additional year of work.  As noted above, a key insight of Stock and Wise
(1988) in the private pension context is that one-year forward measures of this type may be
misleading if there are substantial incentives or disincentives for retirement in future years.  This
was a natural concern in the context of private pensions, which often have dramatic and explicit
retirement incentives at certain ages, such as the plan’s early and normal retirement age.  But is
this an important issue in the context of Social Security? 
In fact, the critical importance of considering the entire future path of incentives is
illustrated in Figure 3.  This figure shows the most common patterns of after-tax SSW evolution
(including payroll taxes paid for additional work) across our sample.  In each figure, we graph for
a group of workers the pattern of SSW evolution over all future years; this is done for the full
cross-sectional sample, comparable to Table 2, where each worker contributes an observation for
up to 14 years.  Each observation is then the pattern of SSW from that year forward, based on
that year’s characteristics.  Under each graph is a figure for the percentage of our full cross-
sectional sample that is in each case, and the cumulative share across the cases.  For example, as
shown in panel 1, 1% of the sample has an SSW that is everywhere increasing; while panel 3
shows that 14% of the sample has an SSW that first rises, then falls.  In each case, the length of
each segment is defined by the median starting and ending age of the segment and the slope of23
the segment is determined by the median SSW at the beginning and end of the segment.   
As these graphs illustrate, substantial non-monotonicities of the type seen for private
pensions also exist for Social Security.  For 38% of our sample, there is a local maximum that is
not a global maximum.  The most common pattern in the data (panel 2), which applies to 48% of
the sample, is one where after-tax SSW is always declining.  However, the second most common
pattern (panel 6), which applies to 29% of the sample, is one where after-tax SSW declines from
55-61, rises from 62-64, then falls.
This is a striking finding, because it highlights an important weakness of the accrual
measure.  For any given year from age 55-61, a typical worker will be lose money on net through
the Social Security system by working.  But, by working, that worker is also buying an option on
the more than fair actuarial adjustment that exists from age 62-64.  Incorporating this option, as
shown in panel 6, leads to the conclusion that there may overall be net subsidies to work before
age 62 for many workers through the Social Security system.
Peak Value
To incorporate this feature into our incentive calculations, we move away from the
accrual and tax/subsidy rate to a more forward looking measure of incentives, which we call
“peak value.”  This is the value of continuing to work until the future year when SSW is
maximized, or the difference between the expected PDV of SSW at its highest possible value in
the future, and the expected PDV of SSW if you retire this year.  So this is like the typical accrual
concept, except that the individual looks forward to the optimal year, rather than just to next year. 
If the individual is at an age that is beyond the SSW optimum, then the peak value is the24
difference between retirement this year and next year, which is exactly the accrual rate.  Once
again, it is natural to think about this type of concept relative to potential earnings, but here what
is relevant is the entire stream of earnings until the optimal SSW is reached.  That is, if the
optimum is $5000 higher than SSW today and is one year away, then this is a larger subsidy to
continued work than if the optimum is higher by the same amount but is five years away.  We
therefore normalize this peak value by the expected PDV of wages over the period between this
year and the year of maximal SSW.  So this concept captures the benefits of continuing to work
towards the peak SSW year, relative to earnings over that period.
We show our peak value calculations in Table 5.  On a pre-tax basis, peak value is
$22,426 at age 55 and falls steadily, becoming negative at age 65.  For the median worker, post-
tax peak value is negative at all ages except for 62-63.  However, 30-40% of workers have a
positive after-tax peak value at ages 55-61.  For these workers, the option value of a more than
fair actuarial adjustment after age 62 outweighs payroll tax payments before age 62.  As a result,
Social Security is actually providing a subsidy to additional work throughout all ages 55-64. 
This subsidy is rather small relative to earnings; the median after-tax peak value for those with
positive values is about $3,000.   After age 65, there is a negative return to additional work for
the vast majority of workers.
Thus, viewed from a year-to-year perspective, the Social Security system taxes work
between ages 55-61 at a modest rate for over 80% of workers; but, viewed from a more forward-
looking perspective, there are actually modest subsidies at those ages for 30-40% of workers
because workers are buying the option of delaying claiming at a more than actuarially fair rate. 
Of course, this conclusion is somewhat overstated, for two reasons.  First, as noted above,25
exercising the option to delay claiming does not require additional work, simply delayed
claiming.  Second, for an individual who was planning to retire and claim at 62 for other reasons,
there is no option value from delayed claiming.  Thus, whether peak value is the relevant concept
for actual retirement decisions at this age is an empirical question, and one which we plan to
explore in further work.  But the fact remains that this option exists and is not recognized by the
accrual concept.
It is worth noting an apparent inconsistency between Table 2 and Table 5.  As should be
obvious, the peak value at any given age is just the sum of all future accruals to the year when
SSW is maximized.  Yet, the sum of the benefit accruals from age 55 forward in Table 2 is not
equal to the age-55 pre-tax peak value from Table 5.  The reason for this apparent inconsistency
is simply composition effects; the median individuals at each age and across the two tables are
different.  There is no clear way to address this in the aggregate, while still representing the
median values for our incentive variables of interest.
Instead, we illustrate that this is not a problem at the individual level in Table 6,  where
we show these concepts for a “typical” individual in our data set, who was age 55 in 1992 and
who has roughly the median earnings of his age cohort in our data.  For this individual, the sum
of the benefit accruals from any given age forward to the peak of SSW (age 66) does equal the
pre-tax peak value at that age.  That is, at age 55, the peak value after-tax is $19,170, which is the
sum of the after tax accruals from age 55 through age 66.  Thus, for a “typical” individual, we see
that there is no inconsistency across these concepts; it only arises when we try to compare sample
medians across the concepts.     
17  Conversations with HRS staff indicate that HRS did not attempt to collect pension
information for people in firms with under 100 employees and that the non-response rate among
employers they did contact was about 30%.
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Heterogeneity
As with after-tax accruals, there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in after-tax peak
values, as illustrated in Table 7.  At age 62, for example, the median after-tax peak value is $274.
However, at that age 48% of the sample has peak values that are less than zero, the 90
th percentile
value is $6,299, and the standard deviation is $7,852, nearly 30 times the median.
The variation in peak values is more readily explained by the other factors that might
naturally be included in a retirement model, as is shown in Table 8. For the after-tax peak value,
including flexible functions of age, earnings, and AIME can explain about half of the variation;
adding marital status, spousal characteristics, and lowest earnings year can explain another 3%. 
Still, a substantial share of the variation in peak value remains unexplained, suggesting that there
is useful identifying variation available for inclusion in a retirement model.
Incorporating Private Pensions
We can also incorporate private pension incentives into our analysis.  The HRS collected
detailed pension determination information from employers for roughly 60% of the individuals
with pensions in the sample.
17  They then used this information to create a pension benefits
calculator that is comparable to the PIA simulation model we developed for Social Security.  We
use these calculated pension benefits at each retirement age to create an analogous set of
retirement incentive variables which include pensions.27
The results of doing this for both of our incentive concepts (accrual and peak value) are
presented in Table 9.  The patterns of incentives by age for the median worker are very similar to
those shown in Tables 2 and 5.  This should not be surprising, as only 40% of our sample has
pensions.  Annual accruals are roughly $700 larger at ages 55-64 when pensions are included. 
The median tax/subsidy rate with pensions is roughly 2-3 percentage points lower at ages 55-64
than the median tax rate without pensions, and is similar at ages 65-69.  With the inclusion of
pension, the after-tax peak value is now often positive for the median person at ages 55-64.
Table 10 shows the impact of including pensions on the distribution of the incentive
measures.  There is a substantial increase in the variation for all measures, particularly at ages 55-
61.  For example, at age 60, the ratio of the standard deviation to the median is close to one for
the tax rate in the no pensions case, but is above three in the with pensions case.  For the peak
value measures, there are similarly large increases in heterogeneity, particularly at younger ages.  
Thus, adding pensions to the analysis does not dramatically change the incentives at the median,
but does add substantial variation to the distribution of incentives.  
Part V: Conclusions
The substantial time series decline in older male labor force participation, as well as the
striking correlation between the labor force departure rates of older workers and the early and
normal retirement ages for Social Security, has motivated an enormous body of literature on how
the Social Security program affects retirement.  Yet, there has been little recognition of a
fundamental mystery in the relationship between Social Security incentives and retirement
behavior: there is no evidence of a substantial disincentive to continued work at age 62, despite28
the enormous increase in labor force exit at that age.  This point was highlighted by Diamond and
Gruber (1998), but this was based on a typical (simulated) individual.  
In this paper, we have expanded on the earlier analysis in four ways.  First, we have
considered the impact of SS retirement incentives in real data, the HRS.  We confirm in these
data that there is fact no tax on work at ages 62-64 at the median, further heightening the
disconnect between observed retirement patterns and the pattern of SS retirement incentives. 
Second, however, we have shown that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in these
incentives across our sample, and that (for example) there is a net tax on work at age 62 for about
one-half of our sample.  This would be more consistent with a “spike” in the hazard rate at that
age, if it is those individuals being taxed who are responding by retiring.  We also show that
factors that otherwise might be expected to naturally impact retirement decisions can explain
only a small share of the variation in accruals, suggesting that these are fruitful regressors for
explaining retirement decisions.
Third, we have suggested the focus on next-year measures such as accruals and
tax/subsidy rates might be misleading, particularly at ages 55-61, because they ignore the option
value of reaching age 62 and taking advantage of a (for many workers) more than fair actuarial
adjustment.  Thus, we also have considered a “peak value” concept which compares wealth
accruals not between this year and next, but instead between this year and the year in which SSW
reaches its peak.  We find that using peak values instead of accruals leads to very similar results
at the median after age 62, but to subsidies to work rather than taxes at ages 55-61 for a large
share of the sample.  Finally, we incorporate private pensions into our analysis; we find that the
addition of pensions increases the return to additional work modestly at the median and29
substantially increases heterogeneity in the measures. 
Our findings have two important implications for future empirical work on Social
Security and retirement.  First, our results suggest that if researchers are careful to condition on
the determinants of both retirement and SS incentive measures, there is sufficient remaining
variation to hopefully identify the impact of these measures on retirement decisions.  Second, our
results suggest that, even in a Social Security-only context, it is important to consider forward-
looking measures of the type pioneered by Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b).  In preliminary work
on retirement decisions (Coile and Gruber, 1999), we have found that these forward looking
measures are indeed an important determinant of retirement behavior, while there is a much
weaker relationship between retirement and accruals.30
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In this appendix, we provide the formula for the computation of SS wealth. 
Notation:
   
t = year of observation
R = year of retirement
T = last year either spouse could be alive (max age is 120)
prh,s|t = probability husband is alive at time s conditional on being alive at time t
prw,s|t = probability wife is alive at time s conditional on being alive at time t
d = real discount rate (.03 in base case)
age62h,s = indicator variable equal to 1 if husband is age 62 or over at time s
age62w,s = indicator variable equal to 1 if wife is age 62 or over at time s
age60h,s = indicator variable equal to 1 if husband is age 60 or over at time s
age60w,s = indicator variable equal to 1 if wife is age 60 or over at time s
rwbh,s = retired worker benefit of husband if husband retires at time s
rwbw,62 = retired worker benefit of wife if wife retires at age 62
dsbh,62 = dependent spouse benefit of husband if wife retires at age 62
dsbw,s = dependent spouse benefit of wife if husband retires at time s
svbh,s = survivor benefit of husband if wife dies at time s
svbw,s = survivor benefit of wife if husband dies at time s
s, k = simple counting variablesFormula:
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1. An important assumption built into the calculation is that the spouse retires at age 62.
2. The benefit variables (rwb, dsb, and svb) are adjusted appropriately for actuarial adjustment or
delayed retirement credit.  The adjustment depends on R, the birth year of each spouse (since SS
rules differ by birth cohort), and age difference between the spouses.  Where an individual first
claims retired worker benefits and later tops them up to the level of the dependent spouse benefit,
the appropriate actuarial adjustment is applied to each part of the total benefit. 
3. Claiming is assumed to occur at first eligibility (the age of retirement or age 62, whichever is
later).  For simplicity, survivor benefits are assumed to be claimed no earlier than age 62, though
individuals are allowed to claim them at age 60, or earlier if there are dependent children.
4. The calculations including pensions are analogous, except that pension receipt commences as
soon as the individual retires (not at age 62).Category
Obs Person- Obs Person-
Year Year
Obs Obs
Men in HRS, ages 55-69, 1980-1997 6,173       40,614     -- --
Drop if born pre-1922 6,052       39,658     121          956         
Drop if missing earnings history 4,305       29,110     1,747       10,548    
Drop if not working 3,445       20,059     860          9,051      
Drop if missing spouse earnings history 3,231       18,903     214          1,156      
Drop if re-enter labor force 3,231       17,547     -- 1,356      
Notes:
(1) Obs is the number of persons for which we have data in the HRS.
(2) Person-year obs is the number of person-year observations for which we have data.
(3) Each row in the first two columns shows the number of observations after the
exclusion labelled in that row.  Each row in the second two columns shows the number of
observations lost through the exclusion labelled in that row.
Table 1:
Sample for Analysis
Number of Obs Obs LostAge Obs SSW Benefit After-Tax Tax Diamond/
Accrual Accrual Rate Gruber
Tax Rate
55 2,811 154,928 2,277 -933 0.047 -0.022
56 2,746 157,205 2,136 -1,136 0.052 0.046
57 2,444 159,341 1,958 -1,314 0.057 0.060
58 2,131 161,299 1,791 -1,517 0.061 0.069
59 1,822 163,090 1,687 -1,781 0.067 0.072
60 1,547 164,777 1,563 -1,848 0.073 0.071
61 1,252 166,340 1,643 -1,848 0.073 0.064
62 1,010 167,983 3,855 -48 0.002 -0.028
63 688 171,838 4,019 46 -0.001 -0.005
64 443 175,857 2,849 -843 0.027 0.031
65 313 178,706 -902 -4,831 0.145 0.188
66 159 177,804 -2,074 -5,833 0.176 0.225
67 91 175,730 -2,908 -6,418 0.249 0.269
68 57 172,822 -4,190 -6,989 0.334 0.439
69 33 168,632 -4,043 -7,138 0.252 0.455
Notes:
(1) Each row reflects the incentives workers face for continued work that year
(e.g., the age 55 row is the incentive to delay retirement until age 56).
(2) SSW is the NPDV of Social Security Wealth at the beginning of the year.
(3) Benefit accrual is the change in SSW that results from working that year.
(4) After-tax accrual is the benefit accrual net of SS taxes paid during the year.
(5) Tax rate is the negative of the after-tax accrual divided by annual earnings.
(6) Diamond-Gruber tax rate replicates results from Table 1 in Diamond and
Gruber (1999).
Table 2:
Accrual and Tax Rate, Medians by AgeAge % With
10th% 90th% Std. Dev. 10th% 90th% Std. Dev. Tax < 0
55 -3,977 92 2,553 -0.003 0.090 0.059 0.175
56 -4,100 154 3,416 -0.006 0.093 0.073 0.176
57 -4,205 178 3,492 -0.008 0.098 0.081 0.152
58 -4,342 212 2,778 -0.010 0.103 0.069 0.144
59 -4,476 212 3,458 -0.012 0.109 0.076 0.135
60 -4,478 272 4,005 -0.014 0.116 0.073 0.140
61 -4,365 340 4,971 -0.017 0.113 0.076 0.150
62 -1,592 2,291 2,945 -0.139 0.068 0.178 0.493
63 -1,657 2,490 2,888 -0.156 0.089 0.172 0.515
64 -2,497 1,628 1,985 -0.110 0.117 0.161 0.336
65 -7,462 -882 4,196 0.044 0.556 0.268 0.058
66 -8,365 -1,591 3,073 0.093 0.771 0.290 0.050
67 -8,627 -1,321 11,069 0.117 1.000 0.386 0.055
68 -9,391 -2,010 3,397 0.117 1.000 0.351 0.053
69 -9,878 -278 3,630 0.117 1.000 0.360 0.061
Notes:
(1) This table shows the 10th and 90th percentiles and the standard deviation
of the distribution of after-tax accruals and tax rates, as well as (in the last
column) the percent of the sample with negative tax rates.
(2) For a description of the incentive variables, see notes to Table 2.
After-Tax Accrual Tax Rate
Table 3:
Heterogeneity in Accrual and Tax RateVariable
R-squared Cumulative R-squared Cumulative
of Variable R-squared of Variable R-squared
Age dummies 0.062 -- 0.044 --
Earnings 0.087 0.155 0.000 0.045
Earnings quartic 0.092 0.158 0.000 0.045
AIME 0.156 0.230 0.012 0.059
AIME quartic 0.171 0.238 0.015 0.064
Earn*AIME quartic 0.198 0.266 0.039 0.081
Married, agediff 0.002 0.270 0.001 0.082
Spouse earn*AIME^4 0.169 0.280 0.033 0.110
Low earn year 0.074 0.284 0.010 0.110
Notes:
(1) The second and fourth columns of the table show the R-squared from 
regressions of the after-tax accrual or tax rate on the variable in the first
column; the third and fifth column show the cumulative R-squared from
including that variable and all previous variables in the regression.
(2) Low earn year includes earning in lowest year and number of years with
earnings below current years.
(3) For a description of the incentive variables, see notes to Table 2.
After-Tax Accrual Tax Rate
Table 4:
Variance Decomposition, Accrual and Tax RateAge Obs SSW Peak Peak % with
Value Value After-Tax
Pre-Tax After-Tax PV>0
55 2,811 154,928 22,426 -820 0.307
56 2,746 157,205 20,477 -1,018 0.292
57 2,444 159,341 18,339 -1,213 0.275
58 2,131 161,299 16,395 -1,399 0.282
59 1,822 163,090 15,228 -1,675 0.288
60 1,547 164,777 13,500 -1,701 0.326
61 1,252 166,340 12,245 -1,694 0.380
62 1,010 167,983 10,812 192 0.525
63 688 171,838 7,652 170 0.538
64 443 175,857 3,280 -758 0.359
65 313 178,706 -864 -4,808 0.077
66 159 177,804 -1,984 -5,799 0.069
67 91 175,730 -2,908 -6,418 0.066
68 57 172,822 -4,190 -6,989 0.053
69 33 168,632 -4,043 -7,138 0.061
Notes:
(1) Peak value is the change in SSW that results from working to
the age at which SSW is maximized (if peak has passed, PV is the
after-tax accrual).
(2) PV pre-tax excludes SS payroll taxes, PV after-tax is net of taxes.
Table 5:
Peak Value, Medians by AgeAge Benefit After-Tax Tax Peak Peak
Accrual Accrual Rate Value Value
Pre-Tax After-Tax
55 2,120 -1,388 0.046 19,170 -1,388
56 2,093 -1,218 0.041 17,050 -1,218
57 2,029 -1,159 0.039 14,957 -1,159
58 1,730 -1,360 0.046 12,928 -1,360
59 1,018 -1,996 0.066 11,198 -1,996
60 674 -2,287 0.074 10,180 -2,287
61 781 -2,077 0.066 9,505 -2,077
62 2,863 110 -0.003 8,725 274
63 2,817 164 -0.005 5,862 164
64 1,747 -804 0.025 3,045 -804
65 999 -1,451 0.045 1,297 -1,451
66 298 -2,052 0.063 298 -2,052
67 -368 -2,621 0.080 -368 -2,621
68 -960 -3,116 0.094 -960 -3,116
69 -1,480 -3,540 0.112 -1,480 -3,540
Notes:
(1) Table shows the incentives for one sample observation.
(2) For a description of the incentive variables, see notes to Tables
2 and 5.
Table 6:
Accrual and Peak Value for Sample ObservationAge % With
10th% 90th% Std. Dev. PV>0
55 -3,936 3,441 8,027 0.307
56 -4,081 4,095 8,384 0.292
57 -4,171 4,808 8,019 0.275
58 -4,310 5,221 8,260 0.282
59 -4,443 5,587 8,803 0.288
60 -4,441 6,589 9,435 0.326
61 -4,338 6,690 9,400 0.380
62 -1,515 6,299 7,852 0.525
63 -1,484 4,628 7,527 0.538
64 -2,428 2,023 5,684 0.359
65 -7,462 -215 7,943 0.077
66 -8,365 -994 10,680 0.069
67 -8,627 -1,200 12,274 0.066
68 -9,391 -2,010 3,849 0.053
69 -9,878 -278 3,630 0.061
Notes:
(1) For a description of the incentive variables,
see notes to Table 5.
Peak Value After-Tax
Table 7:




Age dummies 0.014 --
Earnings 0.024 0.040
Earnings quartic 0.025 0.041
AIME 0.254 0.318
AIME quartic 0.297 0.350
Earn*AIME quartic 0.473 0.491
Married, agediff 0.006 0.497
Spouse earn*AIME^4 0.162 0.518
Low earn year 0.100 0.521
Notes:
(1) See notes to Table 4 for description of table layout.
(2) Low earn year includes earning in lowest year and 
number of years with earnings below current earnings.
(3) For a description of the incentive variables, see
notes to Table 5.
Table 8:
Variance Decomposition, Peak Value
Peak Value After-TaxAge Obs SSW Accrual Tax Peak Peak
After-Tax Rate Value Value
Pre-Tax After-Tax
55 2,811 183,138 -342 0.019 28,417 326
56 2,746 185,767 -381 0.018 25,843 197
57 2,444 188,380 -540 0.032 23,120 -61
58 2,131 190,675 -649 0.040 20,524 -18
59 1,822 192,781 -857 0.047 18,757 -90
60 1,547 194,637 -956 0.051 16,518 329
61 1,252 196,384 -1,003 0.053 14,341 1,143
62 1,010 198,149 672 -0.030 11,431 1,857
63 688 202,891 662 -0.025 7,949 863
64 443 208,312 -381 0.014 3,382 -172
65 313 212,733 -4,237 0.145 -774 -4,179
66 159 211,980 -5,384 0.189 -1,984 -5,369
67 91 210,024 -6,201 0.246 -3,538 -6,137
68 57 207,164 -6,916 0.344 -4,330 -6,916
69 33 203,236 -7,138 0.278 -4,452 -7,138
Notes:
(1) For a description of the incentive variables, see notes to Tables 2 and 5.
These results differ through the inclusion of pension incentives as well as 
Social Security program incentives.
Table 9:
Peak Value Including Pensions, Medians by AgeAge % With % With
10th% 90th% Std. Dev. 10th% 90th% Std. Dev. Tax<0 10th% 90th% Std. Dev. PV<0
55 -3,700 6,213 12,980 -0.177 0.091 0.195 0.366 -3,511 73,702 63,294 0.454
56 -3,701 6,914 10,779 -0.191 0.093 0.181 0.381 -3,570 69,620 57,529 0.476
57 -3,954 6,506 11,202 -0.185 0.100 0.186 0.340 -3,739 58,252 50,959 0.505
58 -4,158 6,517 9,477 -0.182 0.109 0.194 0.334 -3,973 50,340 38,199 0.501
59 -4,436 6,054 11,703 -0.171 0.117 0.189 0.323 -4,251 41,994 34,032 0.504
60 -4,410 5,021 9,189 -0.147 0.117 0.177 0.312 -4,245 34,273 29,530 0.483
61 -4,373 5,339 9,833 -0.149 0.117 0.166 0.322 -4,210 30,574 27,320 0.446
62 -1,677 6,512 7,269 -0.283 0.081 0.216 0.615 -1,495 24,078 21,155 0.347
63 -2,085 5,669 7,410 -0.272 0.106 0.214 0.606 -1,815 17,647 19,821 0.362
64 -2,637 4,540 7,662 -0.188 0.123 0.211 0.447 -2,535 8,479 16,403 0.517
65 -7,762 657 9,306 -0.028 0.556 0.304 0.121 -7,702 1,949 14,390 0.853
66 -9,392 11 5,459 -0.003 0.771 0.308 0.101 -9,392 987 13,680 0.874
67 -9,039 358 11,588 -0.015 1.000 0.403 0.121 -9,039 1,590 14,935 0.857
68 -10,830 -485 11,266 0.067 1.000 0.396 0.053 -10,830 -485 11,267 0.947
69 -10,370 -278 4,407 0.109 1.000 0.358 0.061 -10,370 -278 4,407 0.939
Notes:
(1) For a description of the incentive variables, see notes to Tables 2 and 5.  These results differ through the inclusion
of pension incentives as well as Social Security program incentives.
Peak Value After-Tax
Table 10:
Heterogeneity in Peak Value and Accrual, Including Pensions




























































45-54 women 55-59 women 60-64 women 65+ womenPercent=1.0, Cumulative Percent=1.0 Percent=47.7, Cumulative Percent=48.7
Percent=13.6, Cumulative Percent=62.3 Percent=1.8, Cumulative Percent=64.1
Percent=0.2, Cumulative Percent=64.3 Percent=29.0, Cumulative Percent=93.3
Percent=4.1, Cumulative Percent=97.4 Percent=0.3, Cumulative Percent=97.8
Percent=2.0, Cumulative Percent=99.7









































































































































































55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Age
S
S
W